Can trust agreements exclude  responsibilities for monitoring the plan’s receipt of contributions, determining when they are delinquent and taking appropriate steps for collection?

 A number of DOL investigations have revealed agreements that attempt to relieve the financial institutions serving as plan trustees of any responsibility to monitor and collect delinquent contributions, but when the smoke clears, someone has to bear the ultimate responsibility.

The DOL's problem with these arrangements?  The investigations have revealed circumstances where no other trust agreement or plan document assigns those obligations to another trustee or imposes the obligations on a named fiduciary with the authority to direct a trustee. In other cases, the plan documents and trust agreements are silent or ambiguous on the matter.

In discussing the issues raised by these attempts to limit trustee responsibility, the DOL reinforces its position that the trustees are ultimately responsible for ensuring collection.

Background:  Employer contributions are delinquent when they are due and owing to the plan under the documents and instruments governing the plan but have not been transmitted to the plan in a timely manner. The Department has taken the position that employer contributions become an asset of the plan only when the contribution has been made. However, when an employer fails to make a required contribution to a plan in accordance with the plan documents, the plan has a claim against the employer for the contribution, and that claim is an asset of the plan. Participant contributions that are withheld from wages or paid to the employer are delinquent if they become plan assets while still in the hands of the employer. Under the Department’s regulations, participant contributions become plan assets in the hands of the employer on the earliest date that the amount withheld from the participant’s pay or paid to the employer reasonably can be segregated from the employer’s general assets. With respect to an employee pension benefit plan, this date can be no later than the 15th business day of the month following the month in which participant contribution amounts were withheld from the employee’s paychecks or paid to the employer.

Analysis

The duty to enforce valid claims held by a trust has long been considered a trustee responsibility under common law.

Section 404(a) of ERISA requires that a fiduciary discharge his duties prudently and solely in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries of the plan. The steps necessary to discharge a duty to collect contributions will depend on the facts of each case. In determining what collection actions to take, a fiduciary should weigh the value of the plan assets involved, the likelihood of a successful recovery, and the expenses expected to be incurred. Among other factors, the fiduciary may take into account the employer’s solvency in deciding whether to expend plan assets to pursue a claim.

The Department of Labor has also long held the view that if the plan is not making systematic, reasonable and diligent efforts to collect delinquent employer contributions, or the failure to collect delinquent contributions is the result of an arrangement, agreement or understanding, express or implied, between the plan and a delinquent employer, such failure to collect delinquent contributions may be deemed to be a prohibited transactions under section 406 of ERISA.

Section 402(a)(1) provides that every employee benefit plan shall be established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument, and that the instrument “shall provide for one or more named fiduciaries who jointly or severally shall have authority to control and manage the operation and administration of the plan.”

Section 403(a) of ERISA provides, with certain exceptions, that all assets of an employee benefit plan must be held in trust by one or more trustees, who are to be named in the plan or trust instrument or appointed by a person who is a named fiduciary. Section 403(a) further provides that “upon acceptance of being named or appointed, the trustee or trustees shall have exclusive authority and discretion to manage and control the assets of the plan . . . .” A plan trustee, therefore, will, by definition, always be a“fiduciary” under ERISA as a result of its authority or control over plan assets and, accordingly, is required to discharge its trustee responsibilities prudently and solely in the interest of the plan’s participants and beneficiaries. Although trust documents cannot excuse trustees from their duties under ERISA, ERISA clearly gives named fiduciaries the authority to appoint multiple trustees and to allocate trustee responsibilities among those trustees (including directed trustees).

If the assets of a plan are held by two or more trustees they shall jointly manage and control the assets of a plan except that nothing shall preclude any agreement, authorized by the trust instrument, allocating specific responsibilities, obligations, or duties among trustees, in which event a trustee to whom certain responsibilities, obligations, or duties have not been allocated shall not be liable either individually or as a trustee for any loss resulting to the plan arising from the acts or omissions on the part of another trustee to whom such responsibilities, obligations or duties have been assigned. Similarly, in those cases where the assets of a plan are held in more than one trust, a trustee is responsible only for those acts or omissions of the trustees of the trust for which it is trustee.

Thus, in accordance with the statutory framework described above, authority over a plan’s assets subject to the trust requirement of ERISA, including a plan’s legal claim for delinquent contributions, must be assigned to i) a plan trustee with discretionary authority over the assets, ii) a directed trustee subject to the proper and lawful directions of a named fiduciary, or iii) an investment manager.

According to the DOL, a named or functional fiduciary who has authority to appoint the plan’s trustee(s) must ensure that the obligation to collect contributions is appropriately assigned to a trustee, unless the plan expressly provides that the trustee will be a directed trustee with respect to contributions pursuant to section 403(a)(1) or the authority to collect contributions is delegated to an investment manager pursuant to section 403(a)(2).

Thus, although a fiduciary may enter into a trust agreement under which a particular trustee is not responsible for monitoring and collecting contributions, if no trustee or investment manager has this responsibility, the fiduciary with authority to hire the trustees may be liable for plan losses due to a failure to collect contributions because the fiduciary failed to specifically allocate this responsibility.

If a particular trustee is not responsible for monitoring and collecting contributions under the terms of the trust instrument, that trustee (including a directed trustee) nonetheless would have an obligation under sections 404 and 405(a) to take appropriate steps to remedy a situation where the trustee knows that no party has assumed responsibility for the collection and monitoring of contributions and that delinquent contributions are going uncollected.

A fiduciary is liable for the breach of another fiduciary if the fiduciary “participates knowingly” in the breach of the other fiduciary, or has knowledge of the breach of the other fiduciary, unless the fiduciary takes reasonable efforts under the circumstances to remedy the breach. Efforts to remedy may, depending on the circumstances, include advising the named fiduciary or the Department of Labor of the breach, reporting the breach to other fiduciaries of the plan, directly taking actions to enforce the contribution obligation on behalf of the plan, seeking an amendment of the relevant plan and trust documents, or seeking a court order mandating a proper allocation of fiduciary responsibility over contributions.

The documents and instruments governing a plan cannot serve to absolve a co-fiduciary from liability for failing to take steps to remedy a known breach of another fiduciary. Whether and to what extent information concerning the failure of an employer to forward contributions to a plan constitutes knowledge of a breach that would give rise to co-fiduciary liability will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

Conclusion

Can trust agreements and other instruments define the scope of trustee undertakings and exclude responsibilities for monitoring the plan’s receipt of contributions, determining when they are delinquent and taking appropriate steps for collection? To some extent, DOL says yes, but someone must be responsible for collecting employer contributions, and if the documents are silent, the named fiduciary (or equivalent) is the one.

 

(John Cheek is a Rochester NY CPA with extensive experience auditing ERISA benefit plans.)

Pin It

    Have a problem? I can help!

      I have the experience to get the job done for you!

      I'm located in Caledonia, NY, near Rochester,  but I have clients all over the country.

      Contact me at 585-204-7085, leave a voice message, or email This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. 

 

      Want more information? Join one of my mailing lists.